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Abstract. Today, the methods of incidents / potential crisis situations detecting 
and their criticality level assessing are proposed. However, these methods do 
not describe simultaneous occurrence of several crisis situations and 
determining of the average and total criticality level. In this paper the 
correlation issues of several events - security incidents – are reviewed and the 
mechanism for calculating an average and total criticality level of incidents is 
proposed. A mechanism basis of events correlation, as well as crisis 
management methods itself, includes Delphi methods and fuzzy logic model. 
Proposed mechanism appliance will allow the simultaneous occurrence of 
several incidents to be taken into account and assess their average and total 
impact on the information system. 
Keywords: crisis situation, information security management, correlation, business 
continuity management concept, mechanism, criticality level, impact, fuzzy logic. 
1. Introduction 
The onrush of information technology (IT), along with an increase of communication 
and information processing capabilities, generates a significant increase in the number 
of incidents / potential crisis situations, which are described in international statistical 
reports and materials [1].  
Crisis situations (CS) response problem in IT field is extremely important, though 
not yet sufficiently understood. Today, the role of crisis phenomena response systems 
in the process of managing and maintaining the enterprises viability, institutions and 
organizations of all ownership forms is constantly increasing. At the same time, 
protection not from catastrophic, but, more likely, emergency situations becomes 
more and more actual.  
In [2-4] describes methods for detecting, identifying incidents / potential crisis 
situations (IPCSs), and assessing the incidents criticality level based on fuzzy logic 
and Delphi methods. Fuzzy logic methods for solving similar problems are also used 
in [5]. Paper [6] describes the integrated model of IPCS representation. On the basis 
of these methods a computing complex [7], which implements IPCS control 
processes, is developed. In addition, it is worth noting that a system with a similar 
mechanism of work, described in [9]. 
However, these works do not take into account the simultaneous occurrence 
situation of several (two or more) IPCSs, their reconciling and determination of the 
average and total criticality level. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to 
develop a mechanism for correlating information security incidents and to determine 
an average and total criticality level of their impact on information system using fuzzy 
logic methods. 
2. Incidents correlation mechanisms, average and total criticality 
level determination 
For the formalization of forecasting, detection, identification and assessing processes, 
we introduce the following set of IPCSs: IКS
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words incidents. that can lead to a crisis state, each of which is represented as a 
generalized six-component tuple [6]: 
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which:
iIKS  – identifier of i -th IPCS, which is (or may become) the cause of CS 
occurrence; 
i
P  – a subset of possible parameters used for forecasting or identification 
of i -th incident; 
e
i
T – a subset of all possible fuzzy (linguistic) standards that reflect 
the standard states of the corresponding parameters from the 
i
P  subset; iP~
– a subset 
of the parameters current values for a certain period of time; 
i
ER – a subset of 
heuristic rules (similar to [8]) based on fuzzy parameters that are used to detect / 
identify the i -th IPCS; iLCS – situation criticality level, caused by i -th IPCS.  
A detailed description of the procedure for detecting, identifying the IPCS, is 
described in [3]. 
The revealed situation refers to the crisis one only if its criticality level is higher 
than average or bigger, that is 
e
iLCS BC . Otherwise, the incident either remains 
out of place (at a sufficiently low criticality level) or is responding to it in order to 
control and eliminate it as a normal information security incident. 
Each incident is characterized by a criticality level that is given by a set 
LCS
1
{ }
~
n
i
i
LCS

  { },
~ ~1 n
LCS ,…,LCS ( 1, )i n . Criticality level is determined by the 
parameters of a situation criticality assessing, taking into account their weight 
coefficients, that is
e
1
( *L )~ ~
E
i e
e
LCS

  . It is established that a criticality level can be 
described by taking into account the functional dependencies between eL~ – 
parameters of criticality level assessing. A detailed method for criticality level 
assessing and the set of estimated parameters are described in [2]. 
The disadvantage of this model is a failure to take into account the mutual 
influence of incidents, which coincide in time, on the information system 
environment. Since one or another IPCS is characterized by a set of critical 
parameters that determine the degree of incident impact on the environment in a 
certain aspect, each one of IPCSs can increase the overall level of influence on the 
system depending on the magnitude of their correlation with each other. Thus, the 
correlation coefficient establishes dependency between different IPCSs and can reach 
values from 0 to 1. Moreover, IPCSs that have a homogeneous effect on the 
controlled environment have a correlation coefficient of 1, and IPCSs that affect the 
environment in various aspects and their interdependence is not manifested at all in 
the general criticality level determination, have the correlation coefficient value of 0. 
Therefore, correlated IPCSs increase the effect of each other's influence on the 
environment, which can be represented as the average and total criticality level with 
taking into account their interdependence, and not correlated IPCSs cause impact, the 
level of which can be assessed only separately for each incident. 
Proceeding from these positions, we will propose application in the IPCS model 
and  method for criticality level assessing of the correlation mechanism for a current 
situation. This mechanism is based on certain common criteria of criticality level for 
different IPCSs, additionally the higher the number of identical parameters is, the 
higher the correlation coefficient will be. 
So each incident can be estimated by applying a general set of criticality level 
estimation parameters that are proposed in [2]. The number and composition of the 
characteristic parameters for each IPCS can have different values and is determined 
by the experts. 
Mechanism itself has several stages, in particular: 
1) Determination of the IPCS number, with which operations are performed, and sets 
of evaluative parameters for each of them. 
2) Determination of the main and dependent IPCSs. In this case, write ordering of 
IPCSs set varies is in such a way that the main incident has the 1st number. 
3) Determination of the correlation coefficients for each dependent and main IPCSs 
respectively. 
Let’s consider each of these steps.  
The main element of the integrated IPCSs representation model is an 
iIKS  
identifier that binds a IКS  set element to a specific incident, which is determined by 
its corresponding name. For example, if n=5 we obtain 
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A,B,C,D,E – incidents names. Accordingly each of these incidents is characterized by 
its sets of evaluation parameters 
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Е – number of parameters. For example, under conditions study for an incident A at 
Е=15, 
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In order to determine dependency between IPCSs, we introduce two categories of 
events: the main and dependent incidents. There are two ways to allocate and assign 
the value of the main and dependent events, such as: 
1) by time - the IPCS, which was detected first, acquires the status of the main 
while all the others - dependent IPCSs; 
2) by the criticality level - the status of the main IPCS is assigned to the incident 
with the highest criticality level or selected by an expert or system operator, the user, 
based on the position of which CS aspects he considers the most threatening. For 
example, if human life is a priority, then IPCS that is most threatened in this aspect or 
criticality of information systems operation - IPCSs which interrupt these processes or 
reduce the quality of their provision, will be selected as the main one. 
Of course, the 2nd method is more prioritized, since in that case there is no danger 
of ignoring the critical aspects of the IPCS influence on the controlled environment. 
Correlation coefficient shows same aspects of the impact of different IPCSs and is 
determined by the number of common parameters between main and dependent 
events. Proposed mechanism is based on a consistently determined coefficient of 
correlation between the main and each dependent IPCSs using the formula   
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until all dependencies between IPCSs are taken into account, and moreover 
оснL  is a 
set of evaluation parameters of main IPCS and 
залL  is a set of estimation parameters 
of dependent IPCSs.  
Next, let's unravel the problem of determining the average and total criticality 
levels for a set of detected IPCSs. Note that each of these procedures can be carried 
out both by taking into account the correlation between incidents and without it. 
Thus, an average criticality level can characterize the situation formed from the 
point of view of its development in the time perspective, in particular for the 
formation of forecasts for longer development. To determine an average criticality 
level of a situation that arose from several simultaneous incidents influence we will 
use the following formulas: 
- without taking into account a correlation coefficient 
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where 
~ сер
LCS  is average criticality level of several IPCSs with taking into account  a 
dependancy between them, 
~ осн
LCS  is criticality level of a main IPCS, 
~ i
LCS  - is 
criticality level of і-th IPCS, N - is total number of incidents. 
- with taking into account a coefficient of correlation, which will allow to assess 
criticality level in a particular aspect of identified IPCSs manifestation 
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where 
~ сер
LCS  is an average criticality level of several IPCSs with taking into account  
a dependency between them, 
~ осн
LCS  is criticality level of a main IPCS, 
~ i
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criticality level of other (dependent) IPCSs and 
осн загi
IKS IKSK  is a correlation coefficient 
between a main and corresponding dependent IPCSs, N - is total number of incidents. 
Schematically, the process of finding an average IPCS criticality level and a 
corresponding correlation coefficients is shown in Figure 1. 
Total criticality level of the situation that arose as a result of a set of incidents 
impact is important for choosing the appropriate responses to them. This is due to the 
fact that countermeasures selected for only one IPCS will not be sufficient to 
neutralize a set of them, since each incident brings its part to a general growing level. 
If criticality level of a single incident is estimated between 0 to 100 points, then 
the total amount is likely to exceed 100 points. This situation is unacceptable. 
Obviously, in this case, the definition of a total level can not be carried out by the 
banal addition of individual IPCSs criticality levels. 
Let's use this Shortliffe formula, which is used to determine the degree of trust for 
two or more interconnected evidences in decision-making performed by expert 
systems. Having replaced the "measure of confidence" in it with "criticality level", we 
can use it for our problem. 
We determine the formula for n-value of IPCS criticality level. So, for 2 IPCSs we 
will have 
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. Substituting in the last expression an analytical records of finding 
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and having carried out algebraic transformations we obtain an expression for the 
calculation of a total criticality level of 3 IPCSs 
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By summarizing and systematizing we will formulate a formula for determining a 
total criticality level for n incidents (potential crisis situations) without a correlation 
between them 
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where 
~ сум
LCS  - is total criticality level of several IPCSs without taking into account a 
dependency between them (correlation), 
~ i
LCS  is criticality level of і-th IPCS, N  is 
total number of incidents. 
Similarly to an average criticality level value we can apply mechanism of events 
correlation to the detected IPCSs. Then a criticality level, with taking into account a 
dependency between individual incidents in the aspect of their influence, is calculated 
by the formula 
1
1
)
~ ~ ~ ~
NN
K K K K
сум N і і
i i=i+1
LCS LCS LCS (1- LCS


   , (5) 
where 
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сумLCS  is total criticality level of several IPCSs with taking into account a 
correlation between them, N  is total number of incidents, 
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3. Experimental research of correlation mechanisms, average and 
total criticality level determination 
Let’s consider the work of events correlation mechanisms and assessting of the 
situation total and average criticality levels, which was formed under the influence of 
several IPCSs in an example. 
Let A, B, C, D and E be the identifiers of incidents, where А – Change of climatic 
conditions in the server, В – Network denial of service attack, С – Theft of equipment 
and media, D – Network hack by the violator, Е – Flood. First, we need to define the 
sets of estimation parameters that correspond to each of them in order to detect a 
dependency between these IPCSs. 
Thus the change of climatic conditions in the server is characterized by such a set 
of estimating parameters: 
A
L { TR – 1L ; DVF – 2L ;OS – 4L ;OLED – 5L ; DDI –
10L ;CRT – 11L ;CRP – 12L } . Similarly for a network denial of service attack: 
B
L { TR – 1L ; DVF – 2L ; OS – 4L ; OLED – 5L ; F – 9L ; DDI – 10L ; CRT – 11L ; 
CRP – 12L ; DVChS – 15L } . For stealing of equipment and media: CL { DVF – 2L ; 
OS – 4L ; OLED – 5L ; F – 9L ; DDI – 10L ; DVChS – 15L } . Network hack by a 
violator is characterized by a set 
D
L { TR – 1L ; DVF – 2L ; OS – 4L ; F – 9L ; 
CRT – 11L ; CRP – 12L ; DVChS – 15L } . And the last IPCS is a flood: EL { TR – 1L ; 
DVF – 2L ; GS – 3L ; OLED – 5L ; RTLH – 7L ; F – 9L ; DDI – 10L ; RTLH – 7L ; 
CRP – 12L } . 
During the experimental research IPCSs were simulated and evaluated using the 
CSAS software [7] in a fuzzy and crisp form as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. IPCS assessment results 
IPCS Criticality level FN 
A 60 points or 0,6 0/0,4; 1/0,6; 0/0,8 
B 80 points or 0,8 0/0,6; 1/0,8; 0/1 
C 30 points or 0,3 0/0,1;1/0,3;0/0,5 
D 40 points or 0,4 0/0,2; 1/0,4; 0/0,6 
E 50 points or 0,5 0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7 
Let’s assume that expert has selected a theft of equipment and media as the main 
IPCS, since the main emphasis in the organization's activities is to ensure the 
information confidentiality. Then 
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Let’s calculate the correlation coefficients for the selected dependent events using the 
expression (1): 
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Thus, all correlation coefficients for this set of 5 IPCSs are calculated. 
Let’s calculate an average criticality level without taking into account the 
interdependencies between individual IPCSs, using the formula (2). 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~сер 1 2 3 4 5
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LCS (LCS +LCS +LCS +LCS +LCS )
5
 = (1/5) * ({0/0,1;1/0,3;0/0,5} + 
{0/0,2; 1/0,6; 0/0,8} + {0/0,6; 1/0,8;  0/1} + {0/0,2; 1/0,4; 0/0,6} + {0/0,3; 1/0,5; 
0/0,7}) = (1/5)({0/0,3; 0/0,7; 0/0,9; 0/0,5; 1/0,9; 0/1,1; 0/0,7; 0/1,1; 0/1,3}+{0/0,6; 
1/0,8;  0/1} + {0/0,2; 1/0,4; 0/0,6} + {0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = (1/5)({0/0,7; 1/0,9; 
0/1,1}+{0/0,6; 1/0,8;  0/1} + {0/0,2; 1/0,4; 0/0,6} + {0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = 
(1/5)({0/1,3; 0/1,5; 0/1,7; 0/1,5; 1/1,7; 0/1,9; 0/1,7; 0/1,9;  0/2,1}+{0/0,2; 1/0,4; 
0/0,6} + {0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = (1/5)({0/1,5; 1/1,7; 0/1,9}+{0/0,2; 1/0,4; 0/0,6} + 
{0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = (1/5)({0/1,5; 1/1,7; 0/1,9}+{0/0,2; 1/0,4; 0/0,6} + {0/0,3; 
1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = (1/5)( {0/1,7; 0/1,9; 0/2,1; 0/1,9; 1/2,1; 0/2,3; 0/2,1; 0/2,3; 0/2,5}+ 
{0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = (1/5)({0/1,9; 1/2,1; 0/2,3}+ {0/0,3; 1/0,5; 0/0,7}) = 
(1/5)({0/2,2; 0/2,4; 0/2,6; 0/2,4; 1/2,6; 0/2,8; 0/2,6; 0/2,8; 0/3}) = (1/5)({0/2,4; 1/2,6; 
0/2,8}) = {0/0,48; 1/0,52; 0/0,56} or after defuzzification 
~ сер
LCS 0,52 or 52 points 
on a 100-point scale. 
In order to determine the average value of criticality level for a particular aspect, it 
is usually necessary to apply a correlation mechanism on some particular most 
important characteristic. Since the system [7] allows us to present results in a fuzzy 
and crisp form, we will continue to make calculations to simplify computations using 
the instrument of ordinary (crisp arithmetic). Let’s determine an average criticality 
level of the current situation by the expression (3). 
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  = (1/5)* (0,3 + (4/7)*0,6) + (2/3)*0,8 + 
(4/7)*0,4 + (3/8)*0,5) = 0,32 or 32 points on a 100-point scale. 
Let's analyze the correctness of a mechanism usage for determining a total criticality 
level of a situation depending on taking in account the mutual incidents correlation. 
Let’s calculate a total criticality level without taking into account the 
interdependencies between individual IPCSs, using the formula (4). 
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   = 0,5 + 0,3 ((1-0,6)(1-0,8)(1-0,4)(1-0,5)) + 
0,6 ((1-0,8)(1-0,4)(1-0,5)) + 0,8((1-0,4)(1-0,5)) + 0,4 (1-0,5) = 0,5 + 0,0072 + 0,036 
+ 0,24 + 0,2 = 0,9832 or 98 points on a 100-point scale. 
Let’s apply a mechanism of incidents correlation in order to determine a total  
criticality level of a situation as a result of their complex influence. Let’s determine a 
total criticality level of a current situation in terms of expression (5), and a correlation 
coefficients apply the same as in a previous example, and the input data from Table. 1 
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(2/3)0,8)(1-(4/7)0,4)(1-(3/8)0,5)) + (4/7)0,6 ((1-(2/3)0,8)(1-(4/7)0,4)(1-(3/8)0,5)) + 
(2/3)0,8((1-(4/7)0,4)(1-(3/8)0,5)) + (4/7)0,4(1-(3/8)0,5) =  0,1875 + 0,0577 + 0,1003 
+ 0,3343 + 0,1857 = 0,8655 or 87 points on a 100-point scale. 
As we can see, a total and average criticality level value with taking into account a 
correlation between incidents is lower than without taking into account, which is 
explained by the allocation of a specific aspect of impact assessment, under the 
experimental conditions - preserving the information resources confidentiality. Thus, 
the effect that generates a violation of other characteristics in these calculations is not 
taken into account. 
To check a proposed mechanism adequacy, let’s check the results correctness in 
output as a form of criticality levels input data of all detected incidents, which are 0 
(minimum level) and 1 (maximum level) (Tab. 2). 
Table 2. IPCS assessment results 
IPCS 
Criticality level 
minimum  
Criticality level 
maximum 
A 0 100 points or 1 
B 0 100 points or 1 
C 0 100 points or 1 
D 0 100 points or 1 
E 0 100 points or 1 
Obviously when a criticality level of all IPCSs will be 0 points, then 
~ сер
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К
сумLCS 0 . 
Let’s consider the situation that arises under the incidents influence with criticality 
maximum. We calculate an average (by the formula (2)) and a total (by formula (4)) 
criticality level of the situation without taking into account correlation coefficients of 
incidents in this case: 
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  = 1/5(1+1+1+1+1) = 1 or 100 
points and 
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1((1-1)(1-1)(1-1)) + 0,8((1-1)(1-1)) + 1(1-1) = 1 or 100 points..   
Let’s perform similar calculations with taking into account an incidents correlation 
interdependence according to formulas (3) and (5), respectively:  
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+ (3/8)*1) = 0,64 or 64 points on a 100-point scale and  
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(3/8)) + (4/7)(1-(2/3))(1-(4/7))(1-(3/8)) + (2/3)(1-(4/7))(1-(3/8)) + (4/7)(1-(3/8)) =  
0,375 + 0,038265 + 0,05102 + 0,178571 + 0,357143 = 1 or 100 points on a 100-
point scale. 
As can be seen, the obtained results are quite correct and do not exceed the scope 
of admissible values  0; 1 , which confirms the adequacy of developed mechanisms. 
4. Сonclusions 
The proposed correlation mechanism, the main stages of which are: 1) selection of 
IPCS and estimating parameters sets from the general set which characterize their 
influence on the environment; 2) the choice of the main and dependent IPCSs, as well 
as the corresponding change in the incidents numbering in a system; 3) determination 
of the correlation coefficient of each dependent IPCSs with the main one, that 
determines the interdependence between them.  
The obtained correlation coefficients can be used to calculate the average and total 
criticality levels of a situation that arose under the influence of several interrelated 
and simultaneous incidents (potential crisis situations). The basis of the mechanism, 
as well as in the methods of detection and evaluation of IPCSs, are methods of fuzzy 
logic and Delphi method. 
The correlation coefficients determine the common impact features of each 
incident on the protected system or environment and are determined by comparing the 
criticality level assessment parameters of each IPCS. 
The practical and scientific significance of this mechanism is the ability to 
evaluate the simultaneous impact of several IPCSs in a certain aspect on the state of 
the controlled environment. 
In addition, the determination of the average criticality level will allow to assess 
the situation from the statistical point of view and make forecasts for its further 
development. A total criticality level allows to choose a countermeasures that is 
adequate to a level of risk. And the application of incidents correlation mechanism 
allows to calculate a situation criticality level in a specific aspect of information, 
national or other security [21-24]. 
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